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Problems of International Joint
Ventures in Japan**
Japan is one of the most misunderstood countries as a host of foreign direct
investments. Many foreign companies consider Japan to be unfriendly to foreign
investments, both in government and private enterprise circles. In fact, govern-
mental restrictions on foreign capital are a matter of past history; most Japanese
companies desire trade with foreign companies, and many foreign companies are
successful in Japan. Japan is a more attractive market for foreign capital than
commonly assumed. The purpose of this article is to focus on the business,
corporate, and tax aspects of foreign business in Japan.
The synergistic effects of joint ventures make them popular among foreign
direct investments in Japan. However, a foreign investor considering a joint
venture in Japan must pay careful regard to the Japanese corporate law regula-
tions. Japanese corporate laws differ greatly from those in the United States, and
shareholder agreements may have enforceability problems when ventures sour.
I. General Background of Foreign
Direct Investments in Japan
An American guidebook on international joint ventures states, "Japan can be
described, at best, as a reluctant host to foreign direct investment."' This is a
typical misperception of the Japanese market. Foreign investors tend to believe
that the Japanese Government restricts foreign capital through laws or "admin-
istrative guidances," that Japanese companies only reluctantly trade with foreign
companies, and that the Japanese market harbors little chance for a foreign
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company to make big earnings. This section attempts to correct these misunder-
standings and to show that the Japanese market has many opportunities for
foreign investors.
A. HISTORICAL RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN CAPITAL
1. 1945-1964
Historically, Japan was a reluctant host to foreign direct investments,
particularly in the twenty years after World War II. The war destroyed most
Japanese industries and western technologies were far ahead of Japan's. The
Japanese Government felt that it had to protect domestic infant industries
against strong foreign competitors. As a result, government policy on foreign
direct investment was to admit only foreign capital that would contribute to
Japanese industries' growth and independence. 2 International joint ventures
played important roles in both introducing western technologies and protecting
domestic companies.
3
In 1950, Japan passed the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) to implement this
government policy.4 Under the FIA, all foreign investment and technical assis-
tance agreements had to be approved5 by the appropriate ministry.6 The FIA was
initially strictly enforced through stringent governmental screening and so-called
"administrative guidance. ' 7
2. 1964-1980
As the competitiveness of Japanese firms and the Japanese economy strength-
ened, so did international pressure on the Japanese Government to liberalize the
market for foreign capital. Particularly in 1964, after Japan acceded to the
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) article VIII, which prohibits exchange
restrictions, and joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), which, in principle, prohibits restrictions on direct foreign
investment, the Japanese Government was forced to liberalize its policy on
foreign capital investments. The Japanese Government gradually opened the
market along with its foreign capital investment liberalization schedules in 1967,
1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, and 1975.8
2. 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 4.0[1l] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1989).
3. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE VENTURES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 307 (D. Mowery ed.,
1988).
4. Foreign Investment Act (Act No. 163) of May 10, 1950 [hereinafter FIA]; see supra note 2,
§ 4.01[1].
5. "Approval" (Ninka) is a term of art meaning governmental permission on a private action
necessary to give it legal effect. The government still retains the power to deny the application. Id.
§ 4.03[3].
6. FIA §§ 10-14.
7. For an explanation of "administrative guidance" (gydsei shid6), see 6 DOING BUSINESS IN
JAPAN, supra note 2, § 4.01[l] n.4.
8. Id. § 4.0[11, 4.04[6].
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As a result, foreign direct investment in all but four restricted industries was
approved as a matter of course. 9 The government policy shifted from probation
in principle to approval in principle. However, the government still retained its
discretion to deny applications.
B. ENCOURAGING FOREIGN INVESTMENTs TODAY
In 1979, the Japanese Government abolished the FIA. The Revised Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act (Revised FECA) 10 took its place the
next year. With this change, the automatic approval system was transformed into
a prior notification system. " The Japanese Government surrendered its discre-
tionary power over foreign capital, except for the four excepted industries' 2 and
industries connected with national security,1 3 retaining only the right to prior
notification.
Although under the Revised FECA a foreign investor has to wait thirty days
after filing the notification' 4 (certain exceptions require up to five months15), a
governmental directive 16 shortened the waiting period to two weeks for the four
excepted industries and the national security-related industries, and eliminated
the waiting period for all other industries.
In special cases, the government can suggest 17 or order' 8 a change or stop the
foreign direct investment. It has, however, never made such a suggestion or
order, including in the excepted industries, since the FECA was revised in 1980.
Also, the Revised FECA has no restriction on the foreign capital ratio, except in
a limited number of specified industries, such as telecommunications.
Today, with only prior notification, foreign capital may be invested freely in
most industries in Japan. Indeed, the current climate for foreign direct invest-
ments is encouraging. The economic conflicts between Japan and the United
States or European countries include not only trade, but also direct investment.
The United States particularly insists on "reciprocity," meaning that U.S. com-
panies should be able to invest as freely in Japan as Japanese firms may in the
United States. Under such pressures, the Japanese Government is taking several
measures to encourage foreign direct investments. For example, the Japan De-
9. The four categories in which foreign investment is restricted are agriculture, mining, petro-
leum, and leather. Id.
10. Act No. 22B of 1979 [hereinafter Revised FECA].
II. Id.§ 26.
12. See supra note 9.
13. Industries connected with national security are the aerospace, weaponry, explosives, and
atomic energy fields.
14. Revised FECA § 27 IV.
15. Id. § 27.
16. Tainai Chokusetsu Tbshi ni Kansuru Meirei [Directive on Foreign Direct Investments in
Japan] § 5 II(l)(2).
17. Revised FECA § 27 II.
18. Id. § 27 VII.
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velopment Bank provides a foreign newcomer with lower-rate financing for a
Foreign Direct Investment Encouraging Loan. Also, the Japan Exterior Trade
Research Organization (JETRO) provides essential information to foreign com-
panies on direct investments in Japan.
Every form of direct investment is welcome. Neither law nor administrative
guidance contains a preference between a one hundred percent subsidiary and a
joint venture. Moreover, because of differences in two areas of U.S. and
Japanese law, the Japanese market is more accessible for foreign capital than the
American market. The first area is that of antitrust. In the United States
large-scale direct investments in the form of mergers and acquisitions or joint
ventures require prior notification to the Federal Trade Commission and the
Justice Department for scrutiny of potential antitrust violations.1 9 These agen-
cies view joint ventures with particular suspicion as possible cartels. Although
Japan has an Antimonopoly Law, 20 the Japanese Federal Trade Commission
enforces it less stringently than is the case in the United States. In addition, the
Japanese initiate very few private actions for damages 21 because the law lacks
the incentive of multiple damage recoveries and because the plaintiff must
prove the amount of damage, which is quite difficult to do. The risk of antitrust
problems is thus much smaller in Japan than in the United States.
The second area of law that favors the Japanese market over the American
market is that of products liability. In the United States products liability suits are
numerous and the damage amounts large. The risk of products liability may
discourage foreign companies from investing directly in the United States. In
Japan, however, both the number of products liability suits and any resulting
damage amounts are still small.
C. SOME STATISTICS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN JAPAN
It is difficult to determine exactly the number and amount of investments of
foreign companies or joint ventures in Japan. It is also difficult to determine
whether foreign investments are successful in sales volume, earnings, or
market shares, and their importance in the Japanese economy. Nevertheless, a
statistical evaluation shows that although the impact of foreign direct invest-
ments to the Japanese economy is still not important, the investment amounts
are now rapidly increasing. Many foreign companies are successful in the
Japanese market, and joint ventures play an important role in foreign direct
investments.
19. Clayton Act (Hart-Scott-Rodino Act), § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
20. See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 139-71 (1989).
21. Antimonopoly Law art. 25, 26.
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TABLE 1
STATISTICS ON REPORTED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
24
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Foreign Direct
Investment in 813 493 930 940 2,214 3,243 12,794
Japan. ($1 mil.)
TABLE 2
TOTAL SALES OF FOREIGN COMPANIES (1987)25
All Oil &
Industries Manufacturing Coal Electronics Chemical
Foreign Cos. 10,421 7,357 2,695 1,582 917
(Bil. yen)
All Cos. 11,168 3,257 98 503 301
(100 bil. yen)
Foreign Cos.' Share 0.9% 2.3% 27.4% 3.1% 3.0%
The most reliable and thorough statistic is the total of reported amounts of
foreign direct investments22 disclosed each year by the Ministry of Finance.
Table 1 demonstrates the rapid increase in foreign direct investments in terms of
dollars in 1987 and 1988.23
Table 2 analyzes foreign companies' shares of sales in 1987. As the table
indicates, total sales of foreign companies were more than 10 trillion yen (about
U.S. $67 billion, calculated at 150 yen to a dollar) in 1987. Manufacturing was
worth 7.35 trillion yen (U.S. $4.9 billion). Retail was worth more than 2.9
trillion yen (U.S. $1.93 billion). Market share is still small: 0.9 percent in all
industries, and 2.3 percent in manufacturing. However, in petroleum and coal
products, foreign firms have a significant 27.4 percent share.
Table 3 delineates the earnings-sales ratios of foreign companies. The figures
show that foreign companies tend to be highly profitable in the Japanese market.
22. Revised FECA § 26 III.
23. Another source of statistics on foreign companies is the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI)'s Survey of Foreign Companies in Japan. The annual research questionnaires are
sent by MITI to foreign companies that have 50 percent or more of foreign capital. The survey does
not include finns in finance, insurance, transportation, telecommunications, construction, and agri-
culture. The return rate of the survey is about 50 percent.
24. MINISTRY OF FIN., STATISrTCS ON REPORTED FOREIGN DiRECr INVESTMENTS (1989). The 1983
and 1984 figures do not include money loans.
25. MINISTRY OF INT'L TRADE AND INDUS., SURVEY OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN JAPAN (1989).
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TABLE 3
EARNINGS-SALE RATIOS OF FOREIGN COMPANIES
2 6
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
All Companies 3.5% 3.4% 4,2% 5.3% 6.1%
Japanese Average 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.5%
Manufacturing 4.3% 3.7% 5.4% 5.7% 6.9%
Japanese Average 2.9% 3.6% 3.2% 2.8% 3.7%
The earnings-sale ratio of foreign companies (6.1 percent in all industries and 6.9
percent in manufacturing in 1987) is higher than comparable Japanese averages
(2.5 percent overall and 3.7 percent in manufacturing) for several years.
Research and development activities of foreign companies in Japan have
rapidly expanded recently. The number of foreign-owned research laboratories
has increased 40 percent (137 in 1987); the staffing has increased 85 percent
(5,551 people in 1987); and research and development costs have increased 31
percent, to 80.4 billion yen (U.S. $536 million) in the three-year period ending
in 1987.27
Joint ventures in Japan are difficult to quantify because the definition of
joint venture is ambiguous and because complete statistics are not available on
the equity ratios of foreign companies. One can, however, estimate how
important joint ventures are to foreign direct investments in Japan from the
MITI Survey.
Table 4 discloses that 100 percent foreign capital subsidiaries comprise less
than half of all foreign companies. "Foreign companies" do not include
enterprises with less than 50 percent foreign capital. Clearly, the joint venture
form is frequently used in foreign direct investments in Japan. The joint
venture percentage in foreign direct investments is likely to be higher than
normal for a country without restrictions on foreign capital ratios. Surpris-
ingly, the ratio of fifty-fifty joint ventures is high-more than thirty percent in
manufacturing .29
Finally, the statistics in Table 5 indicate that Japan is the most popular host
country for U.S. multinationals' joint venture activities, particularly as a per-




29. The most convenient source of statistics on foreign companies in Japan is GAISHIKEi KIGYO
SORAN [FOREIGN AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN JAPAN-A COMPREHENSIVE DIRECTORY] published by
TOYO KEIZAI [EASTERN ECONOMICS] every year, even though it is unofficial and the statistics are
incomplete. Its 1991 version also shows the rapid growth of foreign direct investment in Japan in the
1980s and the importance of joint ventures, especially in manufacturing. Id. at 107.
30. KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 51, 59 (1988).
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN COMPANIES BY INDUSTRIES,




























































































































































THE NUMBER OF U.S.-FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES LOCATED IN JAPAN
AND IN HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
30
Location '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 Total
In Japan 14 4 5 4 4 8 8 11 15 73
In high-income
countries 37 14 16 15 14 27 34 40 35 232
% of high-income
countries 38 29 31 27 29 30 24 28 43 31
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II. International Joint Ventures in Japan
from a Business Point of View
A. SYNERGISTIC EFFEcTS AND GIVE-AND-TAKE RELATIONSHIPS
Generally, creating international joint ventures involves seven types of syn-
ergism. 3 1 The first is the lower investment cost to each participant, thereby
reducing risk. Although every joint venture has this effect, it is significant when
the enterprise costs too much for a single company to fund, for example, the
development of a new airplane.32
The second effect is the reduced waste through sharing of facilities, such as
factories, dealer and computer networks, and research and development labora-
tories.33
The third factor lies in combining the competitive advantages of each partner,
for example, creating a joint venture between a company with good technology
and a company with a wide dealer network. 34 This is the most typical synergistic
effect of a joint venture.
The fourth effect is the exchanging of information or the mutual learning of
the other partners' processes or know-how. Although the essential knowledge
could be obtained by a licensing agreement, it is much more efficient through a
joint venture because both parties can exchange information on a give-and-take
basis. Both sides can learn more by operating a business together.35 Neverthe-
less, this exchange of information involves a risk of technology transfer that
could continue to benefit a partner after the dissolution of the joint venture. It
could thus be considered a drawback of joint ventures.
The fifth effect is the entry into developing countries that would otherwise
have restrictions on foreign capital, common among many developing and so-
cialist countries. In these countries, a joint venture is the only opportunity for a
foreign company to make a direct investment. The sixth effect is the reduced
awareness of the foreign presence. It is difficult to define a fifty-fifty joint venture
as either a foreign company or a domestic one. The joint venture form of
31. ZENICHI SHISHIDO & ATSUSHI KuSANO, KOKUSAI GOBEN: TOYOTA, GM JOINTO BENCHA NO
KISEKI [INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A CASE STUDY OF THE TOYOTA-GM JOINT VENTURE] 35
(1988).
32. See, e.g., Roy J. Harris & Bernard Wysocki, Ready for Take Off? Venture with Boeing Is
Likely to Give Japan Big Boost in Aerospace, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1986, at I (attempted joint
venture among Boeing, Kawasaki Juko, Mitsubishi Juko, and Fuji Juko).
33. E.g., NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN [JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSPAPER], Dec. 14, 1987, at 11 (joint
venture among Cathay Pacific, Singapore Air, and Thai Air for using a single computer reservation
system). See also KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS 63 (1986).
34. E.g., Richard Gibson, Honeywell Considering a Bold Joint Venture, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
1986, at 6 (joint venture between Honeywell of the U.S., NEC of Japan, and Bull of France, wherein
Honeywell provides capital and a dealer network in the United States while NEC and Bull develop
and manufacture computers).
35. The archetype of this is the joint venture between Toyota and GM in Fremont, California. See
generally SHISHIDO & KUSANO, supra note 31.
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business thus tends to lessen national economic conflicts, particularly when a
Japanese company makes a direct investment in the United States or Europe.
36
When creating an international joint venture in Japan, however, the fifth and
sixth synergistic effects of a joint venture have no significance because Japan has
no restriction on foreign capital and the foreign presence may be advantageous.
The final effect of the international joint venture is to create alliances among
enterprises. Currently, in many industries, such as those producing automobiles,
computers, semiconductors, or airplanes, the competitive market is worldwide.
Creating alliances among such competitors is therefore now an influential reason
for establishing an international joint venture. 37
In summary, an international joint venture in Japan may result in one or more
of five types of synergistic effects: risk reduction, reduced waste through sharing
of facilities, combining competitive advantages, the mutual learning effect, or
competitive alliances. Not all international joint ventures, however, enjoy this
synergism. Indeed, there are many failing, or at least unsuccessful, joint ventures
both in Japan and worldwide. 38 One of the most important reasons for failing
joint ventures is a lack of the give-and-take relationship between the venture
partners. For example, many domestic partners in developing countries have
nothing to contribute to international joint ventures. These joint ventures will
often never create a real synergistic effect. 39 To create a successful joint venture
and to enjoy the resulting synergism, the joint venturers must have a give-and-
take relationship. Both parent companies should have some bargaining leverage
and maintain that leverage during the joint venture. 40
B. WHY Do FOREIGN COMPANIES SEEK JAPANESE PARTNERS?
Major American and European companies increasingly have noticed the op-
portunities of the Japanese market. They are not only exporting their products,
but also are trying to establish base camps in Japan through direct investments.
These firms, however, are still reluctant to make direct investments in Japan in
36. Most Japanese auto parts makers are formed as joint ventures when they begin manufac-
turing in the United States.
37. E.g., NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, Jan. 1, 1987, at 63 (a joint venture between Toshiba and
Motorola for manufacturing semiconductors in Japan); Richard L. Hudson & Janet Guyon, GTE,
SIEMENS Venture Could Become Power in Digital Phone Exchange Sales, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,
1986 (joint venture between GTE and Siemens for manufacturing digital telephones to compete with
AT&T).
38. See Jonathan B. Levine & John A. Bryne, Corporate Odd Couples, Bus. WEEK, July 21,
1986, at 100.
39. E.g., Julia Leung, Japan-China Oil Venture Beset by Woes, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1986, at
22 (joint venture between Japan and China in developing oil deposits). See Zenichi Shishido, Nihon
Kigy6 no Tai Ajia Chokusetsut6shi no Senryaku-Gijutsu Iten o Chfishin to Shito [Direct Investment
Strategy in Asia by Japanese Industries-Focusing on Technology Transfer], Final Report of the
Research Group on "Direct Foreign Investment" of Foundation for Advanced Information and
Research 13 (1991) [English summary is available].
40. See SHIsHIDO & KUSANO, supra note 31.
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view of its complicated market system. Indeed, some foreign companies are
abandoning their business in Japan. Nevertheless, many successful foreign com-
panies in Japan have come to understand the Japanese market and how to succeed
in it.
4 1
A joint venture may be a wise option of entry into the Japanese market for four
reasons. The first is the opportunity to learn and understand the Japanese market.
The foreign company could learn how to do business in Japan from its Japanese
partner. Although this type of learning is always important for a foreign partner
of any international joint venture, it is particularly important when a foreign
company enters the Japanese market. Many Japanese business customs are not
easily understandable for western managers. While they might learn these cus-
toms from a consulting firm, doing business together with a Japanese company
with expertise in the particular business will provide the greatest opportunity to
learn.
The most notable characteristic of Japanese business custom is the emphasis
on long-term relationships in both intra- and intercorporate relations.4 2 This leads
to the second and third reasons why a foreign company would seek a Japanese
partner.
The second reason is to utilize the credibility or the reputation of a Japanese
partner in Japanese business society, which would otherwise take time to
achieve. Particularly when a foreign partner has a large Japanese partner, such
as Shinnittetsu (Nippon Steel) or Mitsui Co., this advantage would be larger than
the foreign partner imagined. Every transaction by the joint venture in Japanese
business society would work more smoothly than a transaction by a foreign
company alone.43
The third advantage of having a Japanese partner is to use its distribution
network. In Japan, creating a new distribution network is difficult because every
retailer has strong ties with a particular manufacturer or wholesaler. Therefore,
the foreign company seeking a substantial market share in Japan needs a Japa-
nese partner in order to use its distribution network. At the very least, this is the
best way to save time. 44
The final reason for having a Japanese partner is to lessen waste by sharing
facilities, particularly factories or office buildings. The high cost of land in Japan
41. There are approximately three thousand companies whose capital is not less than fifty percent
foreign. The tax-reported incomes of the top two hundred of these firms have increased fifty-five
percent, from 828.4 billion yen in 1983 to 1283.4 billion yen in 1988. DAIYAMONDO [DIAMOND],
July 8, 1989, at 76.
42. See HIROYUKI ITAMI, JINPONSHUGI KIGYO [HUMANISTIC CORPORATIONS] (1988).
43. NIKKEI SANGYO SNINBUN [JAPAN ECONOMIC INDUSTRY NEWSPAPER], June 23, 1988, at 14, 15.
44. Bull, the largest computer maker in France, and Dainihon Insatsu, the leading printing
company in Japan, joined in the manufacture and sale of IC cards in Japan. NIKKEI SANGYO SHINBUN,
June 23, 1988, at 7. Allied Signal and Nihon Gosei Gomu (JSR) joined forces for manufacturing and
selling engineering plastics in Japan. NIHON KEIAI SHINBUN, Dec. 20, 1988, at 11. Cf. DAIYA-
MONDO, July 8, 1989, at 81 (the success of BMW Japan in creating its own dealer network).
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makes building a new factory or renting office space prohibitive. Sharing facil-
ities with a Japanese partner is far more affordable.45
To summarize, the most common reasons for a foreign company to seek a
Japanese partner are: learning how to do business in Japan, utilizing the credi-
bility of the Japanese partner, sharing the distribution network, and sharing real
estate facilities. These factors will also be bargaining leverages for the Japanese
partner.
C. WHY Do JAPANESE COMPANIES SEEK FOREIGN PARTNERS?
What could be the bargaining leverages of the foreign partner in an interna-
tional joint venture? Japanese partners in the main look for three things from
their foreign partners: technologies, brand names, and alliances.
Generally speaking, Japanese companies have been eager to learn foreign
technologies. The principal reason for removing the restrictions on foreign cap-
ital was to obtain western technologies more advanced than domestic technolo-
gies in most industries. Even after Japanese companies have obtained strong
competitiveness in world markets, they are still eager to learn other technologies.
Thus, learning foreign technology is still one of the most important reasons why
Japanese companies create joint ventures with foreign partners. 46
On the consumer level, many European and American brand names are at-
tractive in Japan. Trading companies, large retailers, and even competitors that
have tough battles with stronger competitors in the Japanese market want good
foreign brand names. This need gives strong leverage to foreign firms with good
brand names when they wish to create joint ventures in Japan.47
Currently, Japanese companies tend to use international joint ventures as strategic
alliances in two ways. One is to obtain a competitive edge in the Japanese market.
A company lagging in an industry may want the help of a large foreign competitor
to become a front-runner. 48 Another is to create a long-term, strategic, worldwide
alliance, particularly between large Japanese and foreign competitors. 49
45. E.g., NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, May 18, 1988, at 9 (joint venture between Michelin and
Okamoto will use an Okamoto factory in Gumma prefecture).
46. E.g., NIHON KEtZAI SHINBUN, Mar. 30, 1988, at 9 (joint venture between Hoffman-LaRoche
and Dainihon Inki (DIC) for manufacturing and selling liquid crystal); see also supra note 44 (joint
venture between Bull and Dainihon Insatsu).
47. An example of this is the joint venture between GFT, an Italian fashion conglomerate with
notable brand names like "Ungara" or "Valentine," and Ito Chu, a large Japanese trading firm.
NIHON KEIAI SHINBUN, June 27, 1989, at 13. See also DAIYAMONDO, July 8, 1989, at 65; DAIYA-
MONDO, July 8, 1989, at 85 (joint venture between Hermes and Seibu Department Store); DAIYA-
MONDO, July 8, 1989, at 85 (joint venture between Brooks Brothers and Daido Ltd., a large Japanese
apparel maker).
48. E.g., NIKKEI SANGYO SHINBUN, June 7, 1989, at 15 (joint venture between Nestle and Fujiya
in the food business); see also supra note 15 (joint venture between Michelin and Okamoto).
49. See, e.g., supra note 37 (joint venture between Toshiba and Motorola); see also NIHON
KEIZAI SHINBUN, Oct. 13, 1988, at 17 (joint venture between Suntory and Allied for liquor distri-
bution).
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D. PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN JAPAN
A corollary to the foregoing review of what foreign and Japanese partners each
want from a joint venture is an examination of what kinds of combinations arise
from both sides' needs. Japan seems to have six patterns of combinations in
international joint ventures.
The first pattern is between a foreign company that has an established brand
name and a Japanese trading company or large retailer. 5° The second pattern is
between a foreign company that has good technology and a Japanese competitor
with a good distribution network. 5' The third pattern of joint ventures is between
firms, each having special technologies. The combination would create a syner-
gistic effect. 52 The fourth pattern is between a giant foreign firm wishing to
expand into Japan and a Japanese mid-size competitor needing the help of a
foreign partner to compete with stronger Japanese competitors. 53 The fifth pat-
tern is between a relatively small foreign company with good technology and a
giant Japanese company wishing to diversify into that industry.54 Finally, the
sixth pattern is between giant foreign and Japanese companies in making a
strategic alliance from a worldwide perspective.
55
50. E.g., DAIYAMONDO, July 8, 1989, at 83 (joint venture between Unisys Corp. and Mitsui Co.
on computers); NIHON KEtZAi SHINBUN, Feb. 13, 1988, at 8 (joint venture between West Germany's
Lamda Physic, the world's largest laser maker, and Marubun, a Japanese electronics trading firm);
GAISHIKEI KIGYO SORAN 1991, supra note 29, at 468 (joint venture between Royal Copenhagen and
Takashimaya Department Store); id. at 486 (joint venture between Nina Ricci Parfums and Okamoto
Trading Co.); id. at 495 (joint venture between Williams-Sonoma Inc. and T-ky0i Department Store);
supra note 47 (joint ventures between GFT and Itochu and between Hnrmes and Seibu Department
Store).
51. See e.g., supra note 17 (joint venture between Brooks Brothers and Daido Ltd.); supra note
44 (joint venture between Bull and Dainihon Insatsu); supra note 44 (joint venture between Allied
Signal and Nihon Gosei Gomu (JSR)); see also NIHON KEZAI SHINBUN, Dec. 11, 1988, at 5 (joint
venture between Cookson, an English metal chemical products maker and Honjo Chemical, a metal
chemical products maker in Japan, for selling printing material, etc.).
52. See, e.g., NIrON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Jan. 13, 1989, at I (joint venture between Sears Roebuck
and Seibu Saison); NIHoN KEIZAI SHINBUN, Dec. 21, 1988, at 8 (joint venture between Young &
Rubicam, of the United States, the world's largest advertising firm, and Dentsu, Japan's largest
advertising firm); NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Jan. 12, 1988, at 9 (joint venture between BBC (now
ABB), a West German heavy electronics maker, and Nihon Gaishi for developing heavy batteries);
supra note 46 (joint venture between Hoffman-LaRoche and Dainihon Inki (DIC)).
53. See supra note 45 (joint venture between Michelin, the second largest tire maker in the
world, and Okamoto, the sixth largest tire maker in Japan); supra note 48 (joint venture between
Nestle and Fujiya).
54. E.g., NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, Dec. 7, 1987, at 9 (joint venture between Megatest, an
American IC tester maker, and Kobe Seikosho, a large Japanese iron maker, for providing IC testing
services in Japan); NIKKEI KINYU SHINBUN [JAPAN ECONOMICS FINANCIAL NEWSPAPER], Nov. 13,
1990, at 5 (joint venture between Babcock & Brown, American leveraged buyout experts, and
Nomura Securities).
55. See, e.g., supra note 37 (joint venture between Toshiba and Motorola); supra note 49 (joint
venture between Suntory and Allied); GAISHKEI KIGYO SORAN 1991, supra note 29, at 308 (joint
venture between Yokokawa Electronics and Hewlett-Packard); see also NIKKEI SANGYO SHINBUN,
June 29, 1989, at 28 (joint venture between Yokokawa Electronics and GE).
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HI. Japanese Corporation Law and Joint Ventures in Japan
Japanese law has no special statutes for joint ventures. A joint venture is regulated
as an enterprise created in Japan. This section reviews Japanese corporation law
regarding joint ventures, particularly in comparison with American law.
A. LEGAL FORMS FOR A JOINT VENTURE AND CORPORATION LAWS
Japan has seven types of enterprises, the most popular of which are kabushiki-
gaisha and yugengaisha.56 Kabushikigaisha is known as a corporation in the
United States and Aktien Gesellschaft in Germany. Yugengaisha is equivalent to
the German Gesellshaft mit beschrenkter Haftung (GmbH). The United States
has no equivalent form.
Kabushikigaisha is the only corporate form suited for large publicly held
corporations. The remaining six categories, including yugengaisha, are intended
to be used by small enterprises, typically family enterprises. In Japan, however,
entrepreneurs have ignored the intention of their legislators. Many small enter-
prises have chosen the kabushikigaisha form, although it is not suitable for
closely held corporations. Roughly speaking, besides proprietorships, approxi-
mately half of all existing small enterprises in Japan are kabushikigaisha and the
remaining half are yugengaisha. The number of other forms are negligible. 57
Japanese legislators are currently planning to divide the corporate form
(kabushikigaisha) into a large corporation form and a small corporation form. 58
Once this new law is implemented, small enterprises seeking limited liability will
have a choice of two alternatives: the yugengaisha and the small kabushiki-
gaisha. 
59
The major corporate difference between Japan and the United States is the
existence of many partnerships in the United States, but few in Japan. This
contrast results from the different tax treatment afforded the corporate forms. In
Japan, the corporate forms (gomeigaisha, goshigaisha, yugengaisha, and ku-
bushikigaisha) normally have tax advantages over the noncorporate forms (kojin,
56. The other five types of enterprises are: (1) kojin kigyd, analogous to proprietorships in the
United States; (2) kumiai, analogous to partnerships in the U.S.; (3) tokumeikumiai, analogous to
limited partnerships; (4) g6meigaisha, equivalent to the West German Offene Handels Gesellshaft
and translatable as "incorporated partnerships"; and (5) g6shigaisha, equivalent to the West German
Komandit Gesellshaft and translatable as "incorporated limited partnerships." For more detail, see
Zenichi Shishido, Problems of the Closely Held Corporation: A Comparative Study of the Japanese
and American Legal Systems and a Critique of the Japanese Tentative Draft on Close Corporations,
38 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 338 (1990).
57. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (1983) (Japan).
58. HoMUSHo DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SHOHO-YUGENGAISHA-Ho KAISEI SHIAN [TENTATIVE DRAFT ON
THE COMMERCIAL CODE AND G.M.B.H. AcT] OF 1986 [hereinafter T-NTATIVE DRAFT]. While the
enactment of most of the Tentative Draft recently was postponed for various reasons, there is still
significant theoretical value to introducing it. See Shishido, supra note 56, at 337.
59. Actually, while the Tentative Draft does not create a new form of kabushikigaisha, it does
set forth different rules for a small corporation, depending on certain criteria.
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kigyo, kumiai, and tokumeikumiai). Income tax rates on individuals increase as
the income level rises, with the maximum rate at 50 percent. 60 In contrast, there
is only one income tax rate for corporations, 37.5 percent. 6' These tax advan-
tages for corporate forms over noncorporate forms are not present in the United
States. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum income tax rate for
corporations (34 percent)62 is higher than the maximum tax rate for individuals
(28 percent).63
Most international joint ventures in Japan are created as corporations. The
following sections survey the general regulations on corporations within the
Commercial Code.
64
1. Creation of a Corporation
At least seven promoters,65 personally responsible should the corporation
fail, 66 are necessary to create a corporation in Japan. Currently, there is no
minimum capital requirement for creating a corporation. 67 However, the Tenta-
tive Draft of the Commercial Code has several provisions on the use of stated
capital to protect corporate creditors.
68
First, the draft tries to close existing loopholes regarding minimum levels of
stated capital by creating criminal sanctions for disguised investments,69 and by
prohibiting loans from corporations to their shareholders for a certain period after
60. SHOTOKUZEIHO [INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CODE] § 89. Before April 1989, the maximum tax
rate was 75%.
61. HOJINZEIHO [CORPORATE INCOME TAX CODE] § 66. There is a preferred rate of 28% applicable
only to small corporations with income of less than 8 million yen (approx. $53,000 at a rate of 150
yen per U.S. $1 (this article will use that rate of exchange from this point onward)). Before April
1989, these rates were 42% and 30% respectively.
62. 26 U.S.C. § Il(b) (1988).
63. Id. § 1. Subchapter S is also used by many small corporations to lower the effective tax rate
and to eliminate double taxation. The maximum average tax rate for an individual is 28%, although
persons at certain income levels may be taxed at 33%.
64. The Commercial Code was revised April 1, 1991, partially in accordance with the Tentative
Draft, supra note 58. The following survey is on the regulations prior to the revision.
65. SHOHO [COMMERCIAL CODE] § 165.
66. Id. § 194. The Tentative Draft allows one-person corporations to be created by abandoning
the current rule requiring seven promoters. TENTATIVE DRAFTr, supra note 58, § I-1. The former rule
caused the "phantom stock" phenomenon and often led to later internal disputes.
67. Cf. Yugengaisha H6 [GmbH Act] § 9.
68. The Draft sets the minimum level for stated capital at 20 million yen (approx. $133,000) for
kabushikigaisha and 5 million yen (approx. $33,000) for yugengaisha. In addition, it requires
kabushikigaisha to have a "safe harbor" level of capitalization consisting of stated capital plus an
additional amount of earned surplus, for a balance of 50 million yen (approx. $333,000). These
minimum levels of capitalization are prerequisites to limited liability. TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note
58, § 1 20.
69. Id. § I 11. Disguised investments are attempts to present false capitalization. These invest-
ments are actually without substance. Usually, an investor borrows money from Bank A and deposits
it in Bank B which then issues a certificate of capital deposit. Soon thereafter, the investor withdraws
money from Bank B and returns it to Bank A.
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the creation of the corporation. 70 Second, the Tentative Draft requires more of
the corporate profit to be reserved to supplement the stated capital. 71
It is essential for practitioners creating a corporation to avoid a court's inves-
tigation.72 Creating a corporation with only promoters and without shareholders
(Hokki Setsuritsu),7 3 or having several types of "dangerous agreements," such
as investment in property,74 requires a court to elect an inspector.75 To avoid
these investigations, most corporations are created as public placements (Boshu
Setsuritsu)76 by having some nominal shareholders and almost never taking the
form of investment in property. The corporation may achieve the same effect by
buying property from a promoter after the incorporation without prior contract. 77
The Tentative Draft, however, proposes to eliminate investigations by an
inspector nominated by the court78 where (1) only small amounts of investment
in property are involved, and (2) a corporation contracts to buy small amounts of
property from a promoter after the incorporation. 79 The current regulations have
induced many fuzzy investments and attempts to evade the investigation rules.
2. Corporate Governance
A Japanese corporation has four indispensable organs: shareholder meetings;
the board of directors; representative directors; and supervisors.
a. Shareholder Meetings
The most important functions of the shareholder meetings are electing direc-
tors and supervisors, 80 ratifying by majority vote8 l the dividend plan made by the
board,8 2 and deciding structural changes8 3 by a two-thirds vote.8 4 Dissenting
shareholders have appraisal rights in certain structural changes. s Shareholders
can decide other issues through the bylaws.8
6
70. Id. § 1 12.
71. Id. § IV 13. Cf. SHOH6 § 290.
72. SHOHW § 173.
73. Id. § 170.
74. Id. § 168.
75. Id. § 173.
76. Id. § 174.
77. Cf. id. § 168 1(5)(6). Shareholder ratification, however, with special voting requirements, is
necessary when the corporation buys property for which the compensation is not less than 5% of the
stated capital within two years of incorporation. Id. § 246.
78. Id. §§ 173, 168 1(5)(6).
79. T MNATVE DRAFr, supra note 58, § I 4.
80. SHOHO § 283.
81. Id. § 239.
82. Id. § 283.
83. E.g., id. § 245 (selling all corporate assets); id. § 342 (changing bylaws); id. § 404 (dis-
solution); id. § 408 (mergers).
84. Id. § 343.
85. Id. §§ 245-2, 349, 408-3.
86. Id. § 230-10.
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b. Board of Directors
The board elects87 and supervises8 8 representative directors, makes important
business decisions,8 9 ratifies financial statements made by representative direc-
tors,9 ° and decides on financing either by borrowing money,9 1 issuing bonds,92
or issuing new stocks. 9 3 Particularly because of wide discretionary powers in
issuing new stock and no preemptive right of shareholders, there is a risk of
abuse by the board in using its authority to issue new stock to maintain its
control. The Tentative Draft has a section that gives preemptive rights to all
shareholders of the corporation whose bylaws restrict the transferability of
stock. 9
c. Representative Directors
Representative directors, elected by the board of directors, 95 represent the
corporation and execute daily business.
d. Supervisors
Supervisors are elected at the shareholder meeting, and supervise the repre-
sentative directors, 96 particularly on accounting.
9 7
e. The Risk of Being a Director or a Supervisor
Being a director or a supervisor of a Japanese corporation is somewhat risky
because of Commercial Code Section 266-3. 98 This section was intended to
make a director pay damages to third parties if the director did not use due
diligence; it was not intended to modify the principle of limited liability of
shareholders. 99 However, it has become the Japanese version of piercing the
corporate veil, since the controlling shareholder and the representative director
are the same person in most closely held corporations. In addition to its role as
the Japanese alternative to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, section
266-3 makes nonowner directors actual guarantors of the corporation. too
87. Id. § 261.
88. Id. § 260 1.
89. Id. § 260 I.
90. Id. § 281.
91. Id. § 260 11(2).
92. Id. § 296.
93. Id. § 280-2.
94. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 58, § III 4.
95. SHOHO § 261.
96. Id. § 274.
97. Id. § 281 Il.
98. See also id. § 280.
99. TAKEO SUZUKI & AIo TAKEUCs, KAISHAHO [CORPORATION LAW] 280 (1987).
100. Judgment of May 22, 1973 (Kobayashi v. Hashimoto), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 24
Minshii 1305 (see 2 Misao Tatsuta & Richard 0. Kummert, U.S./Japan Corporate Relations 8-299
(1989) (locally produced textbook for the Asian Law Program, University of Washington School of
Law)); Judgment of June 15, 1972 (Nippon Sutadeo v. Nakamura), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 26
VOL. 26, NO. 1
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN JAPAN 81
Moreover, the Tentative Draft tries to enlarge the personal liability of directors
and managing shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder otherwise
protected from personal liability by the corporate form may be held personally
liable when the stated capital of a corporation is below a certain amount.' 0 1 In
that case, the controlling shareholder will be liable for any labor or tort debts of
the corporation. 1
02
3. Corporate Finance and Dividend Policy
As mentioned above,' 0 3 corporate finance is a matter for the board, either by
equity financing or debt financing.
a. Equity Financing
Because of the high appreciation of stock at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, equity
financing through issuance of new stock by publicly held Japanese corporations
has become common. 104 Joint ventures, however, are mostly closely held cor-
porations and have not benefitted from equity financing. Also, in a joint venture,
every partner usually has veto power, or at least a preemptive right, on issuing
new stock. 105 Therefore, the only real possibility in a joint venture is reinvest-
ment by the partners.
b. Debt Financing
In the United States, long-term debt financing is usually made by issuing
bonds; bank loans are used for short-term financing. In Japan, however, a bank
loan is also used for long-term financing. In the Japanese business world, bor-
rowing money from a bank not only obtains financing, but also buys "insur-
ance" in the so-called "main bank system." The main bank of the corporation
will help the corporation in difficulty. By providing information to the main
bank, the corporation can also obtain a cheaper bank loan.
Japanese corporations rarely issue straight bonds because of restrictions in the
Commercial Code 106 and the lack of an efficient bond market. Although many
changeable bonds are issued, they should be included in equity financing.
MinshQ 984; Misao Tatsuta, The Risks of Being an Ostensible Director under Japanese Law, 8 J.
CoMP. Bus. & CA'. MKT. L. 445 (1986).
101. Generally for kabushikigaisha, the legal minimum amount for stated capital (20 million yen)
plus an additional amount of earned surplus to equal a total of 50 million yen. See supra note 58, 68
and accompanying text.
102. See also "INTtATIVE DRAFr, supra note 58, § 1I 14-16.
103. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
104. Since the crash of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1990, however, equity financing by Japanese
companies has shrunk. See Hidetaka Kawakita, Kabuka Kyaraku to Kigy6 no Shikin Chdtatsu Haito
Seisaku [Corporate Financing and Dividend Policy after the Crash], 43 KIGYO KAIKEI [CORPORATE
ACCOUNTING] 169 (1991).
105. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
106. SHOHO § 297.
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c. Dividend Policy
Generally, accumulation of earnings is considered to be a way of financing.
However, in Japan, as opposed to the United States, the final decision on what
percentage of earnings are paid as dividends and what percentage is accumulated
is made at the shareholder meeting, not by the board. 1
0 7
Dividend policy is an area where conflicts of interest between partners fre-
quently occur. Dividend policy is, at the same time, difficult to agree upon in
contracts beforehand. Partners have no recourse but to balance their interests in
the event of a conflict. '
08
B. JoINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS AND THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT
The joint venture is a kind of closely held corporation because of the small
number of stockholders and the consequent absence of a market for its stock. 109
In most countries, including Japan, the statutory corporate laws are best suited
for publicly held corporations. When a closely held firm is incorporated, entre-
preneurs naturally want to refashion the ready-made form created by the corpo-
rate statute into a custom-tailored form fitting the needs of the particular closely
held corporation.
This demand is particularly strong in a joint venture. Each shareholder (part-
ner) of a joint venture is an enterprise sophisticated in business. Even a minority
shareholder almost always participates in managing the joint venture. Therefore,
at a minimum, special agreements are needed among the participating partners
to prevent the majority shareholding partner from monopolizing the board of
directors. This modifies the principle of stock majority.' l0 Minority partners also
use their bargaining leverage to obtain veto power in important decisions."'
Other areas needing modification of the ready-made form in creating a closely
held corporation, particularly a joint venture, are the principle of free stock
transferability and the independent legal personality of a corporation and its
corollary, corporate perpetuity.
In closely held corporations, all shareholders know each other, and most of
them participate in managing the corporation in some way. Ownership and
management are not separate. These shareholders naturally want to exclude
outsiders. Although stock is not typically freely transferred in a closely held
corporation, the shareholders may want to place legal restrictions on transfers in
order to avoid possible disputes.
107. Id. § 283 1.
108. Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint
Venture, 39 HAST. L.J. 63, 79, 108 (1987).
109. Id. at 68.
110. Id. at 69; UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO), MANUAL ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL JOINT-VENTURE AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ch. 3,
§ 1(4) (1971) [hereinafter UNIDO].
111. Id. ch. 3, § 1(7).
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The most critical problem in closely held corporations is the lack of a stock
market. A minority shareholder has no way of liquidating its investment. This
situation tends to lead to "squeeze out" activities by the majority shareholder." 2
Most international joint ventures have agreements on dispute resolution, such as
dissolution, buyouts, and arbitration." 3 Such a dissolution or buyout agreement,
however, may be against the principle of corporate perpetuity or the independent
legal personality of a corporation.
The legal responses to the pressure to modify the legal model have differed in
the United States and Japan. United States law allows internal relationships to
be modified by shareholder agreement. In contrast, the Japanese tend to provide
several legal alternatives among which a corporation must choose, resulting in
greater restrictions on the modification of internal relationships by shareholder
agreement. The problem of creating a joint venture corporation in Japan is that
the enforcement of the private orderings is not secured.
1. Modification of the Principle of Stock Majority
In a joint venture, a dispute between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders over the modification of the principle of majority shareholder con-
trol or an argument over instituting "proportional representation" is almost
always a major issue. " 4 A typical joint venture agreement includes several types
of "proportional representation." First, the allotment of directors in proportion
to the shares held by each partner is discussed. 115 Second, veto powers on
important decisions are agreed upon. If there were no contractual agreement, a
majority partner could decide nearly everything" 16 and a minority partner would
have no say. In most joint venture agreements, minority partners establish their
veto powers not only over fundamental changes, but also over other important
business decisions such as the issuance of new shares, large loans, or entry into
new markets." 7 Third, how minority partners will specifically be involved in
management, in particular which management positions a minority partner is
eligible to fill, is a major point for negotiation. 8
The enforcement of a shareholder agreement modifying majority control dif-
fers between the United States and Japan. In the United States one is basically
112. See generally FOREST H. O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MI-
NORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985).
113. UNIDO, supra note 110, ch. 8.
114. Id. ch. 3, § 1(4); Donald P. Swisher, Use of Shareholder Agreements and Other Corporate
Techniques in Japanese Joint Venture Corporations and their Validity under Japanese Corporate Law,
9 I r'L LAW. 159, 163-71, 173 (1975).
115. UNIDO, supra note 110, ch. 3, § 1(4).
116. In Japan, the Commercial Code requires there to be a special majority vote (two-thirds of
shares present at the meeting) for some important decisions like mergers or amending bylaws. In the
United States, most state statutes require only a simple majority vote even on such fundamental
changes as mergers.
117. UNIDO, supra note 110, ch. 3, § 1(7).
118. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 112, § 9.01; Swisher, supra note 114, at 173.
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free to modify the principle of stock majority by shareholder agreement," 9 and
several legally enforceable forms (for example, voting trusts,' 20 or using differ-
ent classes of stock12 1) are available. In Japan there is no guarantee of legal
enforcement of agreements modifying the corporate governance model of the
Commercial Code. 122 This absence of guarantee may create substantial problems
for foreign corporations desiring to create joint ventures in Japan.
2. Restrictions on Transferability of Stock
Restricting transferability of stock is an almost indispensable clause of a joint
venture agreement. The United States and Japan differ on how to achieve this
restriction.
The permissibility of shareholder agreements allows U.S. shareholders to re-
strain transferability of stock in several ways. These include: first refusal, pro-
hibiting a shareholder from selling his stock to a third party unless he offers the
same price to the corporation or other shareholders; 123 first options, where the
stock price has been determined by the agreement creating the option; 124 consent
restraints, prohibiting a shareholder from selling his stock to a third party unless
he has obtained the consent of the board or the other shareholders; 25 buyback
rights, where corporations retain the option to repurchase their stock when the
employment relationship terminates, even if the shareholder does not want to
sell;' 26 and buy-sell arrangements, setting the shareholder obligation to sell his
stock and the corporate or other shareholder obligation to buy it in case of death
or retirement. 1
27
In Japan, in contrast, basically only one way to restrict stock transferability is
provided for in Commercial Code section 204-2 and the sections following.
Under those provisions, a corporation may adopt a bylaw restricting stock trans-
119. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462
(1989).
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a) (1990); CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(b) (West 1991); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.30 (1984); Massa v. Stone, 346 Mass. 67, 190 N.E.2d 217 (1963); Carnegie
Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., Ill Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412 (1910).
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703 (McKinney 1991);
Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966).
122. Swisher, supra note 114, at 178-81.
123. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CORPORATIONS 421
(6th ed. 1988); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 765 (1986). This scheme is considered the least
restrictive and such provisions are widely upheld. CARV & EISENBERG, supra, at 422.
124. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 123, at 421; CLARK, supra note 123, at 765. This issue lies
in the divergence between the option price and a fair price. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 123, at
422.
125. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 123, at 421; CLARK, supra note 123, at 765. This scheme
is considered to be the most restrictive. Although some statutes and some cases are more tolerant of
consent restraints, their validity remains uncertain. CARY & EISENBERO, supra note 123, at 422.
126. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 123, at 423; CLARK, supra note 123, at 765.
127. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 123, at 423; CLARK, supra note 123, at 765.
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fers. 128 Under such a bylaw, if the board of directors rejects a potential buyer of
a shareholder's stock, the board must appoint its own buyer to negotiate with the
selling shareholder. 129 If negotiations fail, the shareholder may request judicial
assistance in valuing the stock. 130 Although it is also possible to arrange various
stock transferability restrictions through shareholder agreements, the penalty for
violation of such a contract is only compensatory damages from the contracting
party. The stock transfer will not be rescinded.13' Thus, although many joint
ventures in Japan use the same type of contracts on restricting transferability of
stock as the American joint ventures, they may have an enforceability problem
once a dispute occurs.
3. Dispute Resolutions
Joint ventures generally have no market for their stock, and shareholders
(partners) cannot easily liquidate their investments. Once a shareholder dispute
or deadlock occurs, fair resolution is difficult to obtain. Thus, joint ventures
require methods for their resolution, such as buyout contracts, dissolution con-
tracts, and arbitration contracts similar to those used in general closely held
corporations. 1
32
Before examining the dispute resolution contracts, the statutory means for
recoupment of investments for minority shareholders are outlined. In Japan,
virtually the only opportunities for minority shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations to obtain judicial intervention for recouping their investments are exe-
cuting the appraisal right in case of structural changes, such as mergers or change
of bylaws to restrict stock transferability, 3 3 or requesting the nomination of an
alternative buyer of their stocks when the corporation has a bylaw restricting
stock transfer. 134 The Tentative Draft tries to create new legal means for recoup-
ment of investments for minority shareholders. For example, in a kabushiki-
gaisha that has restrictions on stock transfer, and in a yugengaisha, the Tentative
Draft allows shareholders to require the corporation to elect a transferee of their
stocks "when there has been extremely unfair treatment of some of the share-holders.' 135
In a joint venture, several alternatives are available when planning dispute
resolutions through contracts: asking a third party for binding arbitration, asking
128. SHOH6 § 204 I.
129. Id. § 204-2.
130. Id. § 204-4.
131. 3 SHIN CHOSHAKU KAISHAHCO [CoRPORATE LAW ANNOTATED] 71 (Katsur6 Ueyanagi) (new ed.
1986); Masahiro Maeda, Keiyaku ni yoru Kabushiki no Jdoseigen [Restriction of Stock Transfer by
Contracts] 121-1 HOGAKURONSO 36 (1987); Swisher, supra note 114, at 172-73, 179-80.
132. See generally UNIDO, supra note 110, ch. 4; O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 112, ch. 8.
133. SHOHO §§ 245-2, 369, 408.3.
134. Id. §§ 204-2 to 204-4.
135. TENTATIvE DRAFr, supra note 58, §III 8, § VI 2a-c.
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a swingman director to break the deadlock, or providing for the termination of
the joint venture relationship through some type of buyout. 136 Although selling
the joint venture to a third party is another option, it is not suitable for a
contractual arrangement.
a. Arbitration
Incorporating an arbitration clause into a joint venture agreement is permis-
sible, even in Japan. The Japanese Code of Civil Procedure broadly permits
arbitration. 137 Also advisable is making the joint venture corporation a party to
the arbitration agreement in the event the decision must be imposed on the joint
venture corporation. 138 The arbitration clause is quite popular in Japanese joint
ventures. 139
b. Swingman Directors
The swingman director arranges to have a neutral director from the beginning
to avoid a deadlock in a fifty-fifty joint venture. 14a Japanese corporate law does
not prohibit swingman directors in a joint venture corporation. Many in Japanese
management, however, consider the scheme too risky, thereby making it rare.
c. Buyouts
Two alternatives are available for contractually arranging for a partner to buy
the stock of another: agreements in a set with a restriction on stock transferabil-
ity, and agreements without such a restriction. 14 1 Because the restraint on free
stock transferability significantly modifies an important principle of corporate
law, agreements restricting the transferability of stock are required to have some
means for recoupment of investments. 1
42
As already mentioned, the contractual restriction on stock transferability may
be difficult to enforce in Japan. Nevertheless, American-type agreements, such
as first refusal or first option, are used quite often in Japanese joint ventures.
A typical buyout arrangement without a restriction on stock transferability is
the buy-and-sell agreement. It can be used in a joint venture with only two
partners, particularly in a fifty-fifty joint venture. The agreement is that if a
partner makes a bid to sell stock at a certain price to another partner, the other
partner must either buy the stock with the bid price or sell his own stock at the
136. SHISHIDO & KUSANO, supra note 31, at 156-61.
137. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 786 (Japan).
138. Swisher, supra note 114, at 178.
139. Swisher argues:
Arbitration of intracorporate disputes has had a painful history in the United States, and cannot yet be considered
a reliable remedy, due largely to judicial reluctance to apply it to this field and to often-restrictive arbitration
statutes. On the other hand, in Japan, with its stronger tradition of nonlitigious settlements of disputes of all sorts,
the use of an effective arbitration clause seems quite practicable.
Id. at 177-78.
140. Note, Joint Venture Corporation: Drafting the Corporate Papers, 78 HARv. L. REV. 393, 423
(1964).
141. SmsHiDo & KUSANO, supra note 31, at 159.
142. See generally CLARK, supra note 123, at 767.
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same price to the bidder. 143 Such an arrangement is also called a "Russian
roulette" agreement. Although the buy-and-sell agreement has no valuation
problem, it is not popular in Japanese joint ventures because of its riskiness. It
may also be difficult to enforce.
d. Dissolution
The most drastic dispute resolution is an agreement to dissolve the joint
venture corporation in case of certain events or at the will of one of the partners.
Although the dissolution agreement is often used in American closely held cor-
porations,'", it is seldom used in Japan because of the risk involved.
e. Japanese Reluctance to Have a Divorce Clause
Most Japanese joint ventures currently have the same type of joint venture
agreements as those of general international joint ventures, developed by Amer-
ican lawyers. Many Japanese managers, however, dislike such complicated con-
tracts and are particularly reluctant to include dispute resolution clauses, or
so-called "divorce clauses." Harmony is particularly emphasized, even in busi-
ness, in Japan, and mutual trust gained through daily action is highly valued. It
is incongruous for the Japanese to prepare divorce clauses at the moment when
they begin the business partnership. For example, in the Fremont, California
Toyota-General Motors (GM) joint venture, Toyota management rejected the GM
lawyer's divorce clause proposal, leaving it out of the contract. 145
IV. Conclusion
Today, Japan has almost no statutory or governmental restriction on foreign
direct investment. This openness does not mean, however, that it is easy for a
foreign company to enter into the Japanese market. As is pointed out in the
United States-Japan trade negotiations (the so-called "Structural Impediment
Initiatives"), Japanese product markets between corporations, particularly the
distribution networks, are closed against newcomers (even when they are Japa-
nese companies).46 Most transactions between corporations are not spot trans-
actions, but are executed within the framework of long-term relationships. 147
143. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 109, § 8.04.
144. FOREST H. O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.06 (3d
ed. 1988).
145. SHsnrno & KUSANO, supra note 30, at 141.
146. See Hidejiro Urata & Masahiro Kawai, Seihin Yunya to Ryatsa Sistemu [Product Imports and
Distribution Systems] in NION No RYUTSU [DIsnBurInON SYSTEMS IN JAPAN] 63, 71 (Yoshiro Miwa
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The joint venture form is neither forced by the law nor recommended by
informal governmental guidance. Nevertheless, when a foreign company decides
to make a direct investment in Japan it would be well advised to find Japanese
partners since they can provide the necessary easy access to long-term relation-
ships and the know-how to do business in Japan. Empirical data shows that,
generally speaking, foreign companies eager to learn the Japanese way of busi-
ness and willing to modify their business habits accordingly are successful in
Japan, while those companies that are rigid and try to force their way into the
Japanese market are not.
Of course, just as with the joint venture in general, the successful joint venture
in Japan needs some give and take among the partners. Each partner must have
its bargaining leverage and maintain it throughout the joint venture relationship.
Familiarity with the Japanese business system, essential to successful business
investment in Japan, may provide the Japanese partners their bargaining leverage.
At the same time, foreign companies can exert leverage through the possession
of technologies or brand names appealing to Japanese investors. For foreign
companies in this situation, the joint venture form may be recommended, par-
ticularly in the case of their first entry in Japanese markets.
Foreign business investors in Japan also should be aware that the Japanese
concept of a contract is different from that of western countries, particularly the
United States. Japanese business people consider mutual trust between the trad-
ing partners, which can only be developed by a long-term relationship, most
important. Legal contracts are usually considered as suppletory, and compli-
cated, long contracts may even be considered harmful. Therefore, foreign part-
ners may expect some resistance by Japanese partners against the joint venture
agreements the foreign partners prepare.
Even after the parties enter joint venture agreements, courts are reluctant to
grant specific enforcement when the agreements modify the Commercial Code.
In addition, foreign partners must be cognizant of the differences between Jap-
anese and American corporation law.
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